

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 175413

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY

SUBJECT: CYPRUS PROBLEM AND USSR

FOR HARTMAN

REF: GENEVA 5138 (NOTAL)

1. INR ASSESSMENT REQUESTED IN GENEVA'S REFTEL FOLLOWS.
2. WE TEND TO TAKE ECEVIT'S EXPLANATION OF THE SOYSOL MIS-
SION TO MOSCOW AT FACE VALUE -- THAT IT IS INTENDED TO
ELICIT SOVIET POLITICAL SUPPORT BY ASSURING MOSCOW THAT
ANKARA DOES NOT INTEND TO PARTITION CYPRUS. ANKARA PROB-
ABLY ALSO HOPES TO FORESTALL SOVIETS FROM RESORTING TO THE
UN FORUM WHERE THE TURKISH POSITION IS RELATIVELY WEAK.
WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TURKS MIGHT
IN ADDITION SEEK ASSURANCES OF SOVIET UNDERSTANDING SHOULD
THEY FEEL COMPELLED TO RESUME MILITARY OPERATIONS ON CY-
PRUS, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE ON THIS POINT.

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3. FURTHERMORE, WE DISCOUNT TWO OTHER POSSIBILITIES:

A. THAT ANKARA IS SEEKING SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A PRELUDE TO TURKISH MILITARY ACTION ON THE ISLAND. TRADITIONAL TURKISH FEARS OF THEIR RUSSIAN NEIGHBORS WOULD

OUTWEIGH THE DESIRABILITY OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM MOSCOW OR AN OFFER OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY PRESSURE ON GREECE.

B. THAT ANKARA HAS DECIDED TO INVITE SOVIET PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA TALKS IN EXCHANGE FOR DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. ANKARA WOULD NOT WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF A PERMANENT SOVIET VOICE IN ANY CYPRUS SOLUTION AND ITS ENFORCEMENT WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW FROM SOVIET PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA.

4. SOVIET SUSPICIONS OF TURKEY'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS WILL NOT BE LAID TO REST BY SOYSOL'S REASSURANCES. HOWEVER, MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING TO PROFFER THE TURKS A MODICUM OF POLITICAL BACKING, PRIMARILY FOR LACK OF PROMISING ALTERNATIVES. THE IMMEDIATE SOVIET CONCERN WILL BE TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE IN ANKARA AND SLOW DOWN MOVEMENT TOWARD PARTITION OF CYPRUS, WHICH THE SOVIETS NOW FEAR IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY LIKELY. NOR DO THEY SAVOR PROSPECTS OF A NATO-LINKED GRECO-TURKISH WAR SO CLOSE TO THEIR FRONTIERS. THUS THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE COUNSELLING SOME DEGREE OF RESTRAINT EVEN WHILE EXTENDING MORAL SUPPORT.

5. BUT THEY WILL SEEK TO LINK THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR TURKEY WITH PRESSURE FOR A MORE DIRECT SOVIET ROLE IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SEEM TO SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS TO PUBLICIZE THE SOYSOL MISSION IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MOSCOW IS A PARTY TO CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS. THE USSR WOULD CALCULATE THAT THE TURKISH OVERTURE IS WORRISOME TO THE US AND NATO, AND THAT THE NEW ATHENS GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO TRY A SIMILAR GESTURE.

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6. WE HAVE NOT HAD EVIDENCE OF ANY GREEK INITIATIVE TOWARD THE SOVIETS TO DATE. ALTHOUGH ATHENS WOULD HOPE TO CAPITALIZE ON MOSCOW'S PREFERENCE FOR AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS BY STRESSING THAT TURKEY'S POSITION AMOUNTS TO PARTITION IN DISGUISE, KARAMANLIS WILL, FOR THE TIME BEING, RESIST ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO USE ATHENS FOR EXPLOITING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, POLITICAL SITUATION, MILITARY PLANS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 AUG 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: cunninfx
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE175413
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: MAUTNER/ROTKLEIN/KERST/BARAZ:JDP
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740220-0122
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740857/aaaabwqi.tel
Line Count: 114
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: GENEVA 5138 (NOTAL)
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: cunninfx
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 MAY 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <28 FEB 2003 by cunninfx>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CYPRUS PROBLEM AND USSR FOR HARTMAN
TAGS: PFOR, CY, UR
To: GENEVA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005